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Financial systems have experienced dramatic changes over the last two decades. The 
sharp acceleration in the pace of innovation has significantly altered the traditional face of the 
international financial system. These developments have been mainly due to the interaction of a 
combination of factors. The revolution in information technology, and an associated increase in 
competition, at both the national and international levels, has led to a continuing erosion of 
dividing lines, as the major intermediaries have been global in their geographical coverage and 
universal in their financial functions, encompassing banking, securities market activities and 
increasingly, insurance.  
A structural shift in the international financial architecture can be traced to the 1970s with 
the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s and the subsequent switch to floating 
exchange rates. The collapse of pegged exchange rates, in particular, created a strong demand 
from customers of banks for the hedging of exchange rate risks on a routine basis, while the 
transition from a situation of low and stable inflation and interest rates to one characterized by 
high and variable rates increased the need for firms to hedge their potential risk exposures. The 
increased demand for such risk management services meant that in addition to their traditional 
intermediary role, banks were called upon to provide such services. For example, companies that 
borrowed in their domestic currency, derived income in other currencies from their foreign 
operations and banks could help such companies to control their foreign currency risk. Similarly, 
technology-intensive firms for whom unpredictable short-term revenues imposed severe 
constraints on their research and development (R&D) budgets, approached banks that provided 
products designed to hedge overseas income and plan R&D over longer period. This meant that 
banks had to increasingly diversify out of their traditional banking operations and provide fee-
based services, implying higher incomes although at greater risks. The growth of off-balance 
sheet activities was a natural outgrowth of banks providing such risk management services.  
Having outlined the broad contours of the genesis of off-balance sheet (OBS) activity, the 
rest of the study proceeds as follows. Section II examines the definitional aspects of OBS, while 
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Section III explores the reasons for the growth of OBS. The various types of OBS businesses are 
discussed in Section IV. Section V compares traditional banking operations vis-à-vis OBS 
activity. The Indian experience is contained in Section VI, and the final section syncopates the 
concluding remarks. 
 
II. Meaning of OBS Activities 
The ‘off-balance sheet’ (hereafter OBS) description denotes that the activities involve 
contingent commitments or contracts which generate income to a bank, but are normally not 
captured as assets or liabilities under conventional accounting procedure. Contingent items may 
be recorded in a bank’s accounts as ‘notes to balance sheet’, ‘contingent commitment banking’, 
‘assetless banking’ or even ‘invisible banking’. 
OBS items have been around for a long period of time. For example, dealing in bank bills 
lay at the heart of the British financial system in the nineteenth century. However, these 
instruments came to be widely used only when risks escalated sufficiently. Initially, banks were 
not involved in the action. Futures and options were offered mainly by organised exchange such 
as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Chicago Board of Trade. These were standard 
contracts for hedging of risks associated with volatile markets. However, when corporations 
desired products tailored to their specific needs, they turned to banks for those products. This 
demand led to a wide variety of custom-tailored contracts such as loan commitments, forward 
contracts and swaps. A recent report by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA) shows that the transaction volume of over-the-counter derivatives (in notional amounts 
outstanding) has increased rapidly since the beginning of the 1990s from a mere USD 4 trillion in 
1990 to USD 35 trillion in 2001.  
 
III. Received Literature 
A number of recent studies have examined the issue of why banks engage in off-balance 
sheet activities. These studies primarily focus on US banks’ engagement in loan sales, 
commitments and standby letters of credit. Several authors, for instance, have argued that 
securitisation enables banks to optimise the allocation of risk sharing by shifting risk from risk-
averse to risk-neutral investors (the collateralisation hypothesis). Banks can do so by securitising 
their safest assets off-balance sheet and retaining their risky assets on balance sheet. This 
hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between securitisation and bank risk, because the 
pooling problem (of mixing safe and risky assets on balance sheet) is more acute in risky banks. 
Still others have contended that securitisation motivated by fixed-rate deposit insurance   3
encourages banks to become even more riskier (the moral hazard hypothesis). The argument is 
that banks have a comparative advantage in originating loans, but a disadvantage in warehousing 
low-risk loans. Due to the moral hazard problem, banks can increase their risk while retaining 
their comparative advantage in originating loans by selling relatively high-quality low-risk loans 
and issuing standby letters of credit. A variant of this argument has been advanced which 
contends that loan sales may be motivated by differences in loan and liability opportunities 
among financial institutions (the comparative advantage hypothesis). While certain institutions 
enjoy comparative advantages in loan funding and warehousing (i.e., small and foreign banks), 
other institutions enjoy comparative advantages in loan originating. These advantages stem from 
differences in regulatory taxes that banks must pay in the form of federal deposit insurance 
premiums, forgone interest rates from holding required reserves and mandatory capital 
requirements that exceed those that would be maintained in the absence of regulation (the 
regulatory tax hypothesis).  
In contrast to the above, several other commentators have avered that off-balance sheet 
securitisation may occur in larger quantities for safer banks or induce riskier banks to become 
safer. Their argument is that standbys and commitments are uninsured contingent claims whose 
value increases with the safety of the issuing bank. This provides an incentive for banks that issue 
these claims to increase their safety and it also offers relatively safer banks a comparative 
advantage in issuing these claims (the market discipline hypothesis). For instance, it has been 
observed that the advent of disintermediation-type securitisation (e.g., loan sales without 
recourse) due to changes in technology of monitoring is independent of bank risk and liquidity. 
They have argued that this type of securitisation might change the size of the banking sector but 
not the economic role of banks as holding risky, illiquid, information-problematic loans (the 
monitoring technology hypothesis). 
A number of studies have tested the empirical implications of the competing hypotheses. 
Several authors attempted to explain why banks sell loans by estimating a Tobit model to 
determine the amount of loans that a bank will sell annually. The analysis reveals that a bank’s 
comparative advantage in originating and servicing loans had a larger impact on a bank’s 
probability of selling loans than regulation did, and it had the largest impact in determining the 
amount of loans that a bank will sell. Other authors employed a reduced form logit model to test 
the empirical predictions of their theoretical model that (i) banks are more likely to engage in 
standby letters of credit arrangements that safer banks and (ii) securitised loans are generally safer 
than the loans in the same bank’s asset portfolio. The analysis provides empirical support for both 
hypotheses. Certain commentators examined the relationship between bank risk and standbys   4
issuances. The findings revealed that standbys were positively related to risk for small banks, but 
negatively related to risk for large banks. Others found empirical support for the market discipline 
hypothesis in US commercial banks issuance of OBS instruments.  
Perhaps the most comprehensive piece of evidence is for US banking examined the 
relationship between several types of securitisation and numerous measures of risk and liquidity 
using over 4,00,000 quarterly observations over the period 1983-91. Empirical support was found 
for the monitoring technology hypothesis: growth in disintermediation-type securitisation is 
independent of bank risk and liquidity. More recent work used a logistic model to examine the 
diffusion of five off-balance sheet financial innovations (standby letters of credit, loan sales, 
swaps, options and futures and forwards) and assess the impact of regulatory changes on the 
growth of these instruments. Their analysis suggested that changes in capital regulation had no 
consistent effect on the adoption of these off-balance sheet products.  
 
IV. Types of OBS Business 
Most discussion of OBS activities have focused on those formal and informal 
arrangements that generate contingent claims against the bank, and thereby give rise to potential 
balance sheet or portfolio risk. These are listed in the left-hand column of Appendix 1. If the 
description refers to those activities that generate income without passing across the banking 
institution’s balance sheet, then a much broader range of activities can be incorporated. These are 
listed on the right-hand column of Appendix 1. 
Many of the latter activities are an extension of existing customer –bank relationships and 
enable banks to realize ‘economies of scope’ (cost complementarities in multi-product firms) 
from conventional business. Branch facilities and capital equipment are multi-purpose and can be 
put to work for other transactions. Automated clearing houses set-up for inter-bank settlement can 
be opened up to others enabling corporate customers to deliver instructions on magnetic tape for 
the direct crediting of payments. Computing facilities can be used for establishing up of cash 
management systems for customers. Banks develop skills in portfolio management which can be 
put to use in advising customers and selecting their investments.  
 
V. Comparison with Traditional Banking Operations 
Banks specialize in obtaining and using information about credit risks. They acquire 
proprietary information because firms can thereby avoid having to make business information 
available through market releases. As providers of transaction services, banks have access to 
sources of information which enable them to select better loans and monitor their performance at   5
lower cost than would otherwise be the case. These information services are provided when 
lenders hold claims against financial intermediaries, and delegate to them decisions about the 
allocation of savings to various ends. 
Banks are able to offer these assurances to customers in part because informational 
advantages enable them to select assets which have low individual default risks and in part 
because their portfolio size enables maturities of assets to be staggered to match anticipated 
deposit withdrawals. They also offer a risk pooling service, exploiting the regularities which 
emerge when large numbers of withdrawal options and loan default are combined. Some of the 
pooling takes place within the banking institution, as in the case in retail banking. With wholesale 
banking, most of the pooling occurs across institutions, with loan risks spread by participations 
and liquidity needs shared out among the group of banks which make use of the inter-bank 
funding markets. By straddling the retail and wholesale sectors of the market, banks perform a 
size intermediation function and tailor-made financial packages to customer needs. 
Off-balance sheet activities are also vehicles of information and risk-sharing services. 
They seek to unbundle the risks inherent in underlying assets and make it possible to repackage 
such decomposed risks into synthetic products and deal in the separately. The establishment of a 
credit line earns a bank a commitment fee, affords the customer protection against liquidity needs, 
but exposes the bank to offsetting liquidity risk which it is better able to bear. Banks also protect 
customers against, and themselves incur, asset risk through activities such as bill acceptances and 
standby letters of credit. In both cases, banks essentially guarantee payment of a customer’s 
liability to a holder of its debt, should the customer default. Fees charged to a customer reflect the 
benefit of the lower interest rate by the market on the customer’s paper, once a bank guarantee 
payment is attached. Although the initial incidence of a fee is on the bank’s customer (the 
borrower), the ultimate effect of the lower yield is equivalent to the holder of risky (higher 
yielding) paper paying a premium to the bank, in terms of foregone interest, for protection against 
default. This is analogous to a depositor accepting a guarantee from a bank in lieu of 
unguaranteed interest income on primary securities. 
From the borrowers point of view, the interest rate risk they face can be averted by 
writing a cap or collar contracts with the bank. A cap is a put option which acts as a hedge to the 
buyer against rising interest rates. A floor, on the other hand, is a series of call options and when 
combined with a cap in a collar acts much like a fixed rate of interest. When borrowers negotiate 
a syndicated loan, they normally are allowed to choose the interest rate basis (LIBOR, CD/CP 
rate), the currency of interest and principal and when to draw down the loan. These choices can 
be exercised also off-balance sheet by means of basis swaps, coupon swaps, currency swaps (for   6
altering interest rates), back-up credit lines (for liquidity needs) and futures or forward contracts 
(to alter effective draw down or maturity dates). 
From this comparison, it is clear that much the same functions are being performed in 
off-balance sheet banking as in traditional banking, and moreover, for reasons which are 
essentially the same as those explaining traditional intermediation by banks. Guarantees exploit 
opportunities arising from information asymmetries, where the bank has access to information 
about a borrower’s ‘real’ credit risk and the risk premium which would otherwise be required by 
the market for certain borrowers is greater than the fees charged to them by banks (and other 
financial guarantee insurers). Access to the inter-bank market means that banks may also be 
better able to bear liquidity risk. Any interest rate risk under a revolving credit can also be 
ameliorated in various ways, including shifting risk onto futures market.  
Clearly, banks possess skills in acquiring information and can tap wholesale funding 
markets which enable them to issue guarantees and write commitments of various kinds. One 
reason for doing so is that such activities enable banks to achieve dramatic increases in leverage-
as measured by conventional balance sheet quantities. More importantly, contingent claims, 
dovetailed to meet customer requirements, not only help to strengthen customer relationship, but 
is also a major source of fee income. There are two popularly cited advantages of OBS banking. 
First, since OBS banking does not involve deposit funding, cash-asset reserves are not needed, 
and the implicit tax of reserve requirements is avoided. This enables them to pass on the cost 
savings to customers in terms of lower ‘spreads’ which come from routing deposit and loan 
business off-balance sheet. Second, in the past, banks were not required to maintain capital 
against OBS contingencies, although they are now required to do so under the guidelines adopted 
with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Accord.
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VI. The Indian Experience 
In the pre-liberalisation era, market risk (and interest rate risk, in particular) were not 
much of a concern for the banking sector since the high Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) meant 
that banks investment in Government paper ensured them a steady stream of (interest) income. 
Taken together with the ceiling on borrowing in call money market and the regulated interest rate 
regime, this provided the balance sheets of banks with sufficient liquidity. At the same time, the 
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prescription to keep foreign exchange positions square at the end of the day insulated banks from 
the dangers arising out of liquidity or margin mismatches on account of volatile rates.  
The era of administered regime having given way to one of deregulation, integration and 
increased competition has meant that while the banking sector has become increasingly 
susceptible to the vicissitudes of the global operating environment, on the one hand, heightened 
competition from newer market participants has put pressure on their spreads, on the other hand. 
The dichotomy in the structure of deposit liabilities and loan portfolios in which the liabilities are 
fixed vis-à-vis the floating rate character of the loan portfolio has exposed their balance sheet to 
interest rate risks. Secondly, with growing integration of forex markets with Rupee ones, and with 
banks being allowed to create liabilities and assets in multi-currencies, foreign exchange risks 
have also come to the fore. Thirdly, with the freedom given to banks to investment in bonds, 
shares and debentures of corporates, equity price risk has also become an area of prime concern. 
Alongside, with their spreads coming under stress, banks have increasingly made forays into 
newer domain of operations in order to augment their fee income and as a consequence, OBS 
business has gained in prominence. 
From the policy angle, the Reserve Bank has imparted flexibility to asset-liability 
managers by introducing Forward Rate Agreements (FRAs) and Interest Rate Swaps (IRS) as risk 
mitigation strategies. Following the recommendations of the L.C.Gupta Committee, the 
Government has amended the Securities Contract Regulation Act, 1956 and recognized 
derivatives as securities. The amended definition is broad and covers securitisation instruments 
also. Introduction of Derivatives Act in November 1999 is likely to develop the market for Stock 
Index Futures. In June 2000, both the Mumbai Stock Exchange and the National Stock Exchange 
have introduced Stock Index Futures. Effective March 1, 2000, the Government has lifted the 
bank on forward rate contracts and cleared the way for forward contracts in debt securities. This 
is the basis for index based futures in debt market. 
OBS activity by banks in India picked up only in the mid-nineties. A recent study on the 
determinants of OBS activity for India observed that higher levels of capital and liquid assets 
lowered the incentive of banks to engage in OBS activities. However, the study considered only a 
limited time span, which, in a sense, limited its empirical appeal. Available data for the last few 
years reveal that foreign banks have generally been dominant in terms of their OBS activity, 
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Table 1: Off-Balance Sheet Activities of Bank Groups 
(Amount in Rs. billion) 
Bank Group/ Year  1996-97 1997-98 1996-97 1997-98  1996-97 1997-98
 Forward  Exchange 
Contract 
Guarantees given  Acceptances, 
Endorsements etc. 
SBI Group  177 376 158 168  185 168
Nationalised Banks  509 715 213 233  216 220
Old Pvt.Sec Banks  63 139 19 20  14 16
New Pvt. Sec Banks  84 231 1907 3149  3404 3081
Foreign Banks  1260 2137 115 130  118 125
Scheduled Commercial 
Banks 
2093 3598 524 583 568 560
 Forward  Exchange 
Contract 
Guarantees given  Acceptances, 
Endorsements etc. 
Bank Group/Year  2001-02 2002-03 2001-02 2002-03  2001-02 2002-03
SBI Group  703 792 177 179  386 448
Nationalised Banks  1389 1850 304 356  333 438
Old Pvt.Sec Banks  174 217 33 38  36 46
New Pvt. Sec Banks  486 727 145 156  239 777
Foreign Banks  3579 4222 183 173  698 1222
Scheduled Commercial 
Banks 
6331 7807 843 903 1691 2931
Source: Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India (various years). 
 
The table reveals that total OBS of scheduled commercial banks (SCBs), excluding 
RRBs, witnessed a significant growth over the period under study. For example, total OBS of 
SCBs increased at a compound rate of 48 per cent over the period under study, propelled 
primarily by a rise in forward exchange contract. Over the entire period, forward exchange 
contract have been the most dominant, comprising over 70 per cent of the OBS of SCBs. The 
bulk of the increase in OBS activity has been accounted for by foreign banks which comprise 
nearly three-fourths of the OBS activity of the commercial banking system. The Indian market is 
becoming increasingly active in the area of interest rate swaps and forward rate agreements. 
However, the market is dominated primarily by the foreign banks and some new private banks. 
The participation of the public sector banks in this market tend to be quite low vis-à-vis their 
foreign/new private counterparts.   
Another important OBS activity that has gained prominence in recent years is securitised 
deals. The earliest securitisation in India dates back to 1991 when a foreign bank securitised auto 
loans and placed a paper with GIC Mutual Fund. According to recent estimates, 35 per cent of all 
securitisation deals between 1992 and 1998 were related to hire purchase receivables of truck and 
the rest towards other auto/transport segment receivables. The recent securitisation deal by Larsen 
and Toubro has opened a new vista for financing power projects. National Housing Bank has also   9
been making efforts to structure the pilot issue of mortgage-backed securities within the existing 
legal, fiscal and regulatory framework. 
A major bottleneck in the development of the derivatives market is the absence of a 
reliable structure of benchmark interest rates, for different maturities. With a view to fill this gap, 
National Stock Exchange decided to experiment with the idea of ascertaining the expectations of 
major market participants in arriving at indicative benchmark rates. Based on a daily poll of over 
25 market participants, NSE started disseminating since 1998 its overnight money market rates 
called NSE Mumbai Inter-bank Bid and Offer (MIBOR/MIBID) rates. These rates have since 
gained wide acceptance in the market. Subsequently, the Report of the Working Group on Rupee 
Derivatives recommended, inter alia, introduction of exchange-traded derivatives to supplement 
the OTC derivatives. It recommended four types of contracts for trading: (a) short-term MIBOR 
futures contract, (b) MIFOR futures contract based on 6-month LIBOR and Rupee-Dollar 6-
month forward rate, (c) bond futures contract and (d) long-term bond index futures contract.  
In this context, the Clearing Corporation of India (CCIL), promoted by major banks, 
financial institutions and primary dealers, represents a major market infrastructure to significantly 
improve market efficiency and integrity. In essence, CCIL attempts to address the long-felt need 
for a sound institutional structure to support and facilitate clearing and settlement of trades across 
various financial markets.  
For participants in the forex market, CCIL's intermediation would provide a structure to 
mitigate, and manage, the risks associated with the settlement of these high-value transactions. 
Since the foreign currency leg has necessarily to be settled overseas while the rupee leg gets 
settled locally, time-zone differences come into the picture, adding to the settlement risk. Besides 
bringing tangible benefits in the form of improved efficiency and easier reconciliation of accounts 
with their correspondent banks, CCIL's intermediation in the settlement process brings the benefit 
of lower cost to the participating banks. 
The BIS, in a report on OTC derivatives settlement procedures and counterparty risk 
management had concluded that the creation of a clearing house has the potential to mitigate to 
mitigate the different risks associated with OTC derivatives. It can also reduce systemic risk, if 
the clearing house itself manages these risks effectively. CCIL is working on the regulatory 
designs and processes for settlement of OTC derivatives. CCIL is also awaiting regulatory 
approval for settling cash and tom transaction in the forex segment and for settlement of cross 
currency transactions through the CLS 
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VII. Concluding Remarks 
The growth in financial innovation, reflected in the growing OBS activities of banks, is 
considered one of the most significant developments over the past two decades. Through the 
increased use of OBS items, there has been a notable shift towards capital market instruments. 
These instruments can broadly divided into three groups, euro markets (eurodollars, eurobonds, 
floating rate notes), contingent banking instruments (standby letters of credit and commitments) 
and derivatives (swaps, forwards, futures and options). In addition to these, securitisation has also 
been reflected in the increased marketability of banks’ traditional assets, mainly loans through 
loan sales and loan sales without recourse. Not surprisingly, while demand-side factors have been 
instrumental, supply-side factors (technology, regulation, competition and globalisation) have not 
lagged behind. In spite of its growing popularity the world over, it is only recently that OBS 
activities have gained credence in the Indian context. Recent initiatives by the Government and 
the Reserve Bank are expected further streamline OBS activities in India. 
 
Appendix 1: Summary of Off-Balance Sheet Activities 
Contingent Claims  Financial Services 
(1) (2) 
Loan Commitments  Loan-Related Services 
Overdraft Facilities  Loan Origination 
Credit Lines  Loan Servicing 
Back up Lines for Commercial Paper  Loan Pass-through 
Standby Lines of Credit  Asset Sales with Recourse 
Revolving Lines of Credit  Sales of Loan Participation 
Reciprocal Deposit Arrangements  Agent for Syndicated Loans 
Repurchase Agreements   
Note Issuance Facilities  Trust and Advisory Services 
 Portfolio  Management 
Guarantees  Investment Advisory Services 
Acceptances  Arranging Mergers and Acquisitions 
Asset Sales with Recourse  Tax and Financial Planning 
Standby Letters of Credit  Trust and Estate Management 
Commercial  Letters  of  Credit  Trusteeship for Unit Trust, Pension Plans and 
Debentures 
Warranties and Indemnities  Safekeeping of Securities 
Endorsements  Offshore Financial Services 
Financial Support to Affiliates/ 
Subsidiaries 
 
 Brokerage/Agency  Services 
Swap and Hedging Transactions  Share/Bond/Mutual Fund Brokerage 
Forward Foreign Exchange Market  Insurance (life and General) Brokering 
Currency Swaps  Real Estate Agency 
Currency Futures  Travel Agency 
Currency Options   
Cross-Currency Swaps  Payment Services   11
Interest Rate Swaps  Data processing 
Cross-Currency Interest Rate Swaps  Network Arrangements 
Interest Rate Options  Clearing House Services 
Interest Rate Caps, Floors and Collars  Credit/Debit Cards/Home Banking 
  Cash Management Systems 
Investment Banking Activities   
Securities Underwriting  Export/Import Services 
Securities Dealership/Distribution  Correspondent Banking Services 
Gold and Commodities Trading  Trade Advice 
Market-Making in Securities  Export Insurance Services 
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